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Summary: A Modern great book of Military History. Buy it and read it!
`The Face of Battle' by renowned English military historian, John Keegan is one of those books I would always keep in stock if I were managing a bookstore. In its own field of `analytical' military history, it is probably one of the two or three most important works available to the average reader (that is, not including classified material and training material reserved for the world's professional military at West Point, Sandhurst and what have you).
This is the kind of book you always want to find as quickly as possible when you become interested in a new field. Like `Principles of Gardening' by Hugh Johnson, `Mastering the Art of French Cooking' by Julia Child and Snedecor and Cocheran's `Statistical Methods', these are the books which, while not complete, are the kinds of works which can inspire on in a subject as well as simply provide good information. They are the kinds of books that should be at the top of all bibliographies that survey their subjects.
When my method of choice for misspending my youth was playing wargame simulations when practically the only way to do this was with cardboard counters on a 28 by 32 inch hexagonally gridded map, I stocked up on all sorts of glossy picture books on maps and descriptions of classic battles. One of the most common statements in these books was the importance of `mixed arms', meaning that a combination of infantry, mobile (horsepower or motorized), and indirect fire (slings, archery, artillery, rockets) was always more effective than one type of force going it alone. Unfortunately, none of these books did a good job of explaining how this really worked. Keegan's book addresses this and many other similar important aspects of military operations.
And, he addresses these matters for battles in three very different eras of military technology and sizes of military forces. The most salient difference between the three battles is that each later battle took place with forces and venue easily a whole order of magnitude larger than the one before. The French and English forces at Agincourt, for example, faced one another across a front of about a third of a mile. The Napoleon's French and the allies commanded by the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo faced one another on a front of about 3� miles (not including the curl of the right flank when the Prussian IV Corp. arrived in the evening. On the Somme, the British faced the Germans on a front of at least 15 miles. The weapons were also different by a less precise order of magnitude. The queen of the battlefield at Agincourt, which famously beat the much larger French army was the English longbow. The dominant weapon at Waterloo was the artillery which, in battles up to the American Civil War, was a direct fire weapon, placed in front of the infantry or at least interspersed with infantry battalions. The dominant weapon at the Somme was the indirect firing artillery and the machine gun. The tank did not play a major role in the battle of the Somme and it is clear in this book that the original objective of the tank was as a counter to the deadly effectiveness of the machine gun, which dominated infantry battles even more than the famous artillery of the time.
It is not too surprising that an English military historian should choose to write about three battles where an English army or English lead coalition was one of the two major combatants. The first is also not surprising because, as Keegan points out, the Battle of Agincourt was remarkably well documented compared to other military actions of the period. Once Agincourt is chosen, it's an easy jump to another important English battle that is also distinctly different in technology and size. It is easy to talk about Waterloo to an English speaking audience since such a large part of that audience would know Waterloo better than almost any other battle with the possible exception of Gettysburg where, unfortunately, the English army did not make an appearance.
It is easy to see why the last of the three was the battle of the Somme, as the most important elements were those which colored the whole history of this war. That is, trenches, artillery, infantry, and the machine gun. One surprise is that in spite of the 100 years between Waterloo and the Somme, the battle for the Somme was actually simpler to analyze. Cavalry had disappeared from the field as an effective force and the tank had not yet arrived to replace it, artillery had fallen back to indirect fire positions, and the most important contact was between advancing infantry and entrenched machine gunners. This was after the brief `age of rifles' which dominated the 19th century wars of colonization and before true mechanized warfare.
The truest measure of the book's importance is that it gives us tools with which we can analyze other battles, providing the narrators of other conflicts are kind enough to give us the right information. But now we know what to look for, thanks to Keegan's very important book, to which all his later works seem to be applications of the same point of view.
Absolutely essential for any fan of history.
Summary: Classic of its Kind
Its impossible not to see how much this landmark influenced military history. So many authors publishing works today were inspired by Keegan many years ago. The main strntghs of Keegan's work is the approach he brings to studying military history. The first portion of the book is taken up with a fascinating discussion of the history of battle piece writing. Keegan shows what has been done, and how many works tell us very little about the events which they purport to describe. Too many books have approached the subject of battle writing from the top down. What the general(s) were doing. The strategy of war itself, the intricate planning and preparation for battle.
Many historians busy themselves more with minute descriptions of topography, showing us that yes, they actually went to the place in question! Many more don't even bother as much! Keegan tries to tell us that this tradition follows heavily on the old Roman writings of Caeser and others. These were often works of propagandistic nature, meant to embellish the campaigns of the writer. The Greek school, older than the Roman provides a more varied and individualistic perpective. Keegan tells us that it is the later method that we should try more to write in our study of military history.
Unless we begin to understand what the mechanics of battle are, from the actual participants themselves, we may never truly understand what warfare is. This means paying closer attention to chroniclers and memoirs, and often reading inbetween the lines to glean more detail out of their accounts. Many times these works implied certain knowledge and thus tended to express their accounts in ways which a targeted audience of the day would easily understand. Over the decades and centuires we have lost that imtimate association with the events and we must re-learn what was implied in many first-hand accounts. This can lead to distortion if not carefully done. As modern historians we can often read what we want into these older works, and the results can be further disruptive toward our greater understanding.
Keegan's systematic approach toward three distinct battles from the Middle Ages to WW1 is intended to provide a large cross-section of historic warfare. By choosing three distinct battles from history, we can chart the differences and similarities of warfare over the ages. We can also reappraise what have often become standard, famous accounts of well known battles. In each battle Keegan breaks the action down to various tactical componets, allowing the reader to see how different parts of armies were suppose to work against each other.
For Agincourt there are only a few established chroniclers to choose from, but a careful reading of their descriptions armed with the intent to analyse their words in a more tactical sense can still provide useful information which might challenge long established views.
With Waterloo there are a plethora of memoirs which were put together by Sibourne to describe the British aspect of the battle. Keegan intertwines them quite usefully to get at different details of the battle, but it is unfortunate that he limits his eye-witnesses to only English written works. Subsequent research has shown that many French, German and Dutch/Belgian accounts were written in their own languages. If Keegan had included some of these an even greater perspective of Waterloo might have emerged. This dates his research somewhat, but it does not openly detract what he sets out to do.
So many military historians have barrowed from the Keegan method that plagarism no longer really matters. The research methods of this book have become part of the military history lexicon. While the three battles discussed are all well known, each has unique aspects brought out, and the nuts and bolts human elements examined brings out many hidden details. All combines to provide a more thorough and complete understanding of what battles were like. All serious students of military history should read this book.
Summary: Eye-opening
As an un"blooded" new infantry officer, I am quite interested in what to expect should I find myself facing combat. This book tackles that issue in a direct manner. Keegan has written a very readable description of what soldiers face on a battlefield; from the sensation of up-close killing to the plight of the wounded and captured. He does not moralize (except perhaps at the end where it's appropriate). He wrote this in the mid-1970s and at the end he predicts that war has made itself obsolete. Obviously we've managed to find ways around the nuclear threat. I highly recommend this book to those wanting a realistic, scholarly approach to this topic.
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